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tive history of section 4 as well as the plain meaning of the statute
itself will restrain any further judicial extension of the kind wit-
nessed in Lincoln Mills through Avco. The matter does seem
ripe for a Congressional solution, for the Avco decision, allowing
unions to thwart employers' efforts to end wildcat strikes by in-
junction simply by removing to a federal court, will have a drastic
effect on the balance of power in labor relations.
JOHN M. DRAIN, JR.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS - LOSS OF
CONSORTIUM - WIFE'S RIGHT TO RECOVER
FOR NEGLIGENT INJURY TO HUSBAND
Copeland v. Smith Dairy Prod. Co., 288 F. Supp. 904
(N.D. Ohio 1968).
The recurring question of a wife's right to recover for the
negligent interference of third parties with the marital consor-
tium of her husband has been raised again in Ohio - this time
in a federal district court. The recent case of Copeland v. Smith
Dairy Products Co.' was a personal injury suit in which Mr. Cope-
land claimed, among other injuries, a permanent loss of a por-
tion of his sexual capacity. Mrs. Copeland, as co-plaintiff, alleg-
ed loss of her husband's services and marital consortium. Her
demand for compensation raised two issues: whether she had a
cause of action for loss of services and consortium, and whether
a denial of such a cause of action would violate her constitutional
right to equal protection of the law. Dismissing the wife's claim,
the court held that application of Ohio law would not deny her
equal protection. Since no constitutional question of merit had
been raised, the federal district court sitting in a diversity action
was bound, under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,2 to
apply the state law as enunciated by the highest court of the state
which did not provide a cause of action for the wife for loss of
consortium resulting from negligence.
injunctive powers. See cases cited in Comment, Injunctive Relief Against a Union's
Violation of a No-Strike Clause, 52 CORN. L.Q. 132, 136 n.37, 138 n.61 (1966).
The lower federal court cases after Sinclair were about evenly divided on whether
or not to permit removal from a state court. See cases cited Comment, supra note 45,
at 502.
WIFE'S LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
Recovery for interference with the rights of consortium orig-
inated in the English common law and was based on early Roman
concepts of the inferior position of the wife.' The unity created
by marriage resulted in the wife's identity blending into that of
her husband's. The wife's inferiority led early courts to grant a
cause of action for loss of consortium only to the husband.4 With
the advent of the various Married Women's Acts5 there has been
a departure from these common law concepts, and today the wife's
status is generally on a parity with her husband's. As early as
1878, the Ohio courts permitted the wife to recover in an action
separate from her husband's for an intentional interference with
consortium, without any proof of loss of services.6 A husband can
also recover for negligent interference with consortium if he can
prove a loss of services,7 but in the case of Smith v. Nicholas
Building Co." a wife was held to have no such right.
Lately, however, some Ohio courts have refused to follow the
earlier pronouncements, viewing the disparity between husband
and wife in the area of negligent interference as evidence of un-
equal protection for the wife.9 Nevertheless, the Copeland court
1288 F. Supp. 904 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
2 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For a discussion of the doctrine of this case, see note 10
infra.
3 For historical treatment of the wife's position in the family, see 1 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIEs 443 (Christian ed. 1807); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 118, at 903 (3d ed.
1964); Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 651 (1930);
Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICI-L L. REV. 177 (1916);
Note, The Case of the Lonely Nurse: The Wife's Action for Loss of Consortium, 18
W. REs. L. REV. 621, 623-28 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lonely Nurse).
4 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at 442; 3 BLACKSTONB, supra note 3, at 143. The
cause of action has been analogized to that of interference with the master-servant
relationship. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 895, 915; Lippman, supra note 3.
But see 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at 140, 142, where a distinction is made between
recoverable injuries to a wife and to a servant The wife's injuries, resulting in dep-
rivation to the husband of the company and assistance of his wife, raised a form of
action in trespass called per quod consortium amisit. Recovery for loss of services of
the servant was per quod servitium amisit.
5 See H. CLARK, DOMESTic RELATIONS 261-79 (1968).
6Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E. 102 (1912) (defendant sold
morphine to plaintiffs husband, knowing he was an addict); Westlake v. Westlake,
34 Ohio St. 621 (1878) (father wrongfully induced his son to send away and aban-
don plaintiff daughter-in-law).
7 Curry v. Board of Comm'rs, 135 Ohio St 435, 21 N.E.2d 341 (1939); Smith v.
Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915); Crowe v. Bumford, 13
Ohio App. 2d 208, 235 NXE.2d 247 (1968) (husband denied recovery for failure to
present evidence of any compensible loss of wife's services).
8 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 NE. 204 (1915). It also would seem that the wife in Ohio
has no right to the services of her husband. Id.
9 Leffler v. Wiley, 15 Ohio App. 2d 67, 239 N.E.2d 235 (1968); Umpleby v. Dor-
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followed the ruling of Smith, which remains the only authorita-
tive pronouncement of the Ohio Supreme Court on the subject.
Lacking a federal question on which to base a decision, the federal
district court is obliged to follow state law.' ° Thus, in Copeland,
the court was required to consider first the question of equal pro-
tection, for if there were no violation of the Federal Constitu-
tion, application of Ohio law would be mandatory. The deductive
reasoning of the court closely followed that of the Smith court:"
A husband has no independent cause of action for negligent loss
of consortium unaccompanied by proof of loss of services. A
wife, in Ohio, cannot prove loss of services because she has no
right to the services of her husband. Therefore, the wife can have
no cause of action for negligent interference. The conclusion
reached by the court was that the wife is afforded identical ap-
plication of the law and that there is no unequal protection.
12
Once this issue was decided, the federal court, following state
law as set forth in the Smith decision, dismissed Mrs. Copeland's
complaint. The court did suggest, however, that Ohio should re-
consider its position on prohibiting an independent right of re-
covery for negligent interference with consortium.
sey, 10 Ohio Misc. 288, 227 N.E.2d 274 (C.P. 1967); Clem v. Brown, 3 Ohio Misc.
167, 207 N.E.2d 398 (C.P. 1965). Anchoring their decisions on the Federal Constitu-
tion, these courts have permitted the wife to recover.
In Ganoe v. Stoner, Civ. No. 837 (Lake Cry. Ct. App. 1968) (unreported, but
opinion partially quoted in Copeland v. Smith Dairy Prod. Co., 288 F. Supp. 409
(N.D. Ohio 1968), the Lake County Court of Appeals strongly intimated the need
for a change in the anachronistic Ohio law on the subject of the wife's recovery for
loss of consortium, but yielded because of its subordinate position within the state
court system. More recently, however, the Lake County Court has taken a definitive
position holding that loss of consortium is an item of damages available to a wife on
the same basis as it is to a husband. Durham v. Gabriel, 16 Ohio App. 2d 51 (1968).
10 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal courts are obliged to follow
state law in questions not related to federal laws). Erie interprets law to include the
statutory law as well as the uncodified judge-made law of a state's highest court.
Erie has since been interpreted to provide that where the highest court in a state has
not made a ruling on a point of law, lower court decisions (appellate) may be fol-
lowed. Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940). But in King v.
Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 333 U.S. 153 (1948), it was de-
cided that a federal court was not obliged to follow a court of common pleas of South
Carolina, whose rulings were not binding precedent on any other court in that state.
1 1 In the Smith case the court said:
In none of the cases to which our attention has been called has it been held
that the right for which plaintiff is contending here existed in the husband
unaccompanied by a claim for a loss of services. There is no reason then
why the wife should be permitted to maintain an action where the same right
does not exist in the husband. 93 Ohio St. at 104, 112 N.E. at 205.
12 288 F. Supp. at 905.
13 ld. at 906.
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Significantly, it appears that the federal court sat without bene-
fit of the reasoning and logic of the Franklin County Court of
Appeals, which handed down Leffler v. Wiley'- only 3 days before
Copeland. In Leffler the court declared that Ohio laws presently
afford unequal protection for the wife in the area of marital con-
sortium. The court exposed an underlying discrimination based
on sex'5 and noted that consortium is always an element of dam-
ages for the husband, provided that he can prove loss of services.
At the same time, consortium can never be an element of dam-
ages in a wife's claim for negligent interference, because she is
effectively foreclosed from this element by the present state law.'6
The importance of Copeland lies in the court's position on the
question of equal protection. Although no appeal has been filed,"
the potential for major changes in Ohio law remains. Because a
common pleas decision from one county jurisdiction is not bind-
ing on another county in Ohio,'8 and because a decision from a
federal district court is not always binding on state courts,' 9 it is
conceivable that similar future actions may produce decisions which
are both contrary to the Copeland decision and in accord with the
four inferior courts that have permitted recovery by the wife. In
view of the present conflict on this issue and the potential for
more conflicting decisions, the Ohio Supreme Court may view it-
self as compelled to hear this issue to resolve the lack of uniformity
problem within the state.
If the Ohio Supreme Court is confronted with the issues raised
in Copeland, it would seem to be limited to three paths of action:
14 15 Ohio App. 2d 67, 239 N.E.2d 235 (1968).
'5Accord, Durham v. Gabriel, 16 Ohio App. 2d 51 (Lake Cty. Cr. App. 1968).
The equal protection argument is appealing because it "focusses attention on the per-
sistent adherence of the courts to subtle forms of discrimination against women." H.
CLARK, supra note 5, at 275.
16 See notes 16 & 17 supra & accompanying text.
'7 Plaintiffs do have identical actions pending in the common pleas courts of Ash-
land County (Case No. 30068) and Wayne County (Case No. 44708). Defendant's
Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 7, 8, Copeland v. Smith Dairy Prod.
Co., 288 F. Supp. 904 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
18 Wolf v. Gardner, 386 F.2d 295 (6th Cir. 1967). Decisions of state courts of
appeal also are not binding on each other, although these courts frequently follow
each other in the interest of stability (unless a decision is dearly wrong). Io re
Anstaes Estate, 4 Ohio App. 2d 284, 208 N.E.2d 771 (1964); Pilkington v. Saas,
25 Ohio L. Abs. 663 (Ct. App. 1937). It is probably of substantial significance that
two Ohio Courts of Appeal have adopted a position contrary to the Smith case. See
cases cited note 9 supra.
19 Kelley v. Ford Motor Co., 104 Ohio App. 185, 139 N.E.2d 99 (1957); 21
C.J.S. Courts § 206, at 377-78 (1940).
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the court may (1) reaffirm the present law as set forth in Smith,
while dismissing the constitutional argument; (2) overrule Smith
on a non-constitutional basis; or (3) discard precedent on the con-
siderations of equal protection as guaranteed in the state and fed-
eral constitutions.20 The first alternative would unify case law
within the state and effectively overrule the lower court decisions
that permit recovery by the wife.2 Public pressure might then
force the question upon the state legislature. This result appears
inappropriate, because the rule against the wife's recovery origi-
nated in judicial decisions and, therefore, it can be argued that the
proper place for change is in the courts. 2 The second choice -
overruling Smith on a non-constitutional basis - also would re-
solve the problem of lack of uniformity of case law within the
state; furthermore, the acceptance of this alternative would result
in the return of the wife to a position of parity with her husband.
However, such a decision might not be forceful enough to cause a
total reexamination of all the surrounding areas of law relevant to
the marital relation in order to insure that the wife is, in fact, en-
tirely equal to her husband in the rights and protections afforded
her. Finally, the third alternative would present the anomaly of
divergence between state and federal interpretations of equal pro-
tection.
The last two paths of action, occasioning a reversal of Ohio's
present position on denial of a wife's consortium action, could pro-
vide impetus for examination and change in several related areas
of law. Of specific interest are the Married Women's Acts,23 the
intentional-negligent interference dichotomy,24 and the husband's
duties or services to his wife."3 The Married Women's Acts com-
prise the root substance of the consortium problem. Did these
20 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; OHIO CoNsT. art. I, § 2 (1851).
21 Cases cited note 9 supra.
22 See H. CLARK, supra note 5; Note, Judicial Treatment of Negligent Invasion of
of Consortium, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1341 (1961). But see Stone, The Common Law
in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REv. 4, 12 (1936), where Chief Justice Stone stated:
Judge-made law, which at its best must normally lag somewhat behind ex-
perience, was unable to keep pace with the rapid change .... It was in-
evitable that the attempt should be made to supply the unsatisfied need by
recourse to legislation. So it has become increasingly our habit to look for
the formulation of legal doctrine suited to new situations, not to the courts...
but to the legislature ....
23 OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.09, 3103.01-.08 (Anderson Supp. 1967).
24 For an extensive discussion of this problem, see Ekalo v. Constructive Serv.
Corp., 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965); Lippman, supra note 3.
2 5 See OHIO REV. CODE §§ 3103.01, .03 (Anderson Supp. 1967).
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Acts create new rights for the wife; or has her right to consortium
always been present? Affirmative answers to either of the ques-
tions preclude further argument for denying the wife a right to
recovery. If both questions are answered in the negative, then the
further question arises: should the wife now be given the same
right as the husband? Alternatively, should the present rights of
the husband be taken away from him in order to insure equality of
treatment of both parties ?26 If the wife is her husband's equal,
perhaps she no longer owes him services.
The intentional-negligent interference dichotomy has resulted
from the courts' early insistence on a separation of intentional and
negligent torts. Two theories exist to form the basis for this cur-
rent distinction in the area of marital relations. The first and
more prevalent theory emphasizes the punishment of the inten-
tional wrongdoer.2 7  Proponents of the punishment concept, not
wishing to extend punishment to the unintentional act, would
severely curtail recovery in the area of negligent interference. The
second theory focuses on the injured party rather than the tort-
feasor, and proposes compensation for the injury.28 Perhaps the
time has come for public policy to dictate that Ohio courts replace
old notions of punishment with the more realistic proposal of com-
pensation to the injured party, regardless of the type of interfer-
ence. Pointing a judicial finger at the distinction drawn between
the intentional and negligent interference, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia brought this problem into its proper
perspective when it stated that "Etihe civil side of the court cannot
permit an award of punitive damages except as incidental to an
actionable civil wrong." 29  The concept of punishment or punitive
2 6 Nine states have chosen the alternative that the husband no longer has a cause
of action for negligent injury to his wife. H. CLARK, supra note 5, at 273. See
generally W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 913; Lippman, supra note 3, at 662; Lonely
Nurse, supra note 3. But see Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium,
22 Ma-L L. REV. 1 (1923):
The insistence on equality between the spouses is certainly justified, in view
of the present public opinion, and such equality is certainly the end toward
which the Married Women's Acts tend. But can it not be attained better
by giving the right to the wife than by taking it away from the husband?
Id. at 8.
27 
"In such cases the law usually inflicts heavy damages upon the wrongdoer, more
in the nature of punishment than as compensation. It is not necessary that there be
any pecuniary loss." Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. at 105, 112 N.E. at
205 (1915). See also Lippman, supra note 3, at 654-60.
28 See Lippman, supra note 3, at 654-60.
29 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 816 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
852 (1950).
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damages has no foothold in the area of tort law unless there is
first an actionable wrong830 The basic wrong is the injury and the
intent to injure is viewed as a justification for punitive damages.
The logic of the Copeland court 1 in adhering to the Ohio law
glosses over the hidden inequalities that lie within the laws associ-
ated with domestic relations. Courts have held that a wife cannot
sue for the services of her husband because the husband can re-
cover for his own losses; 82 however, consideration of the principle
that a wife may also recover for her own personal losses33 will
show the illogic of the original argument and the inequity of per-
mitting this reasoning to continue.
A second inconsistency in the logic of Copeland is demon-
strated by the ruling that marital consortium does not include the
services of a husband.34 Regardless of the implication of Smith, a
husband does owe services to his wife. The importance of a wife's
rights in the area of sexual intercourse is emphasized by the multi-
ple grounds - adultery, impotency, and fraud - that are now
available to her for dissolution of the marriage.85  The loss of a
husband's sexual capacity should be considered a separate and dis-
tinct loss or injury to his wife. 6 Although the nature of the ser-
vices supplied by the husband may differ from those supplied by
the wife, the husband's services definitely inhere in the marriage
30 These damages would then be appended to the normal compensation of the
injured party, for they do not arise from an independent cause of action. See Schu-
macher v. Siefert, 35 Ohio App. 405, 407, 172 N.E. 420 (1930). See also C. MC-
CORMICK, DAMAGES § 83 (1935).
81 See text accompanying notes 11 & 12 supra.
32 Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915).
38Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Glen, 66 Ohio St. 395, 64 N.E. 438 (1902) (per-
sonal injuries and suffering); Hrvatin v. Cleveland Ry., 69 Ohio App. 499, 44 N.E.2d
283 (1942) (income lost from employment outside the home); Stritmatter v. McArthur,
21 Ohio L. Abs. 31 (Cr. App. 1935) (loss of ability to perform domestic services).
34 See, e.g., Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1378, 1394 (1952), noting that denial of re-
covery for the wife is not inconsistent with allowing a husband to recover on the theory
that the action is based on his right to her services and that there is no corresponding
right in the wife. "This is a valid distinction if the premise that the right is depen-
dent on services is correct, but it is very doubtful if such a premise is valid ... ." Id. at
1395.
35OHIo REV. CODE §§ 3105.01(C), (D), (F), 3105.31(D), (F) (Anderson
Supp. 1967). Fraud has been construed to include concealed intent not to have sexual
intercourse with the marital partner. Miller v. Miller, 1 Ohio Dec. 354 (C.P. 1894).
For a general discussion on marriage laws, see Ross, The Ohio Law of Marriage, 14 W.
REs. L. REV. 725 (1963).
36Compare Lippman, supra note 3, at 662-64, with 57 COLtM. L. REV. 902
(1957).
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relation 7 Undoubtedly critics may find other inconsistencies in
the logic of the Ohio law of consortium. However, the doubtful
efficacy of continued emphasis on lost services of either the wife
or the husband is of primary concern. Compensation should be
founded on the "violation of inherent marital rights." '
The propriety of continuing to deny the wife recovery for loss
of consortium has been questioned by sources outside the judiciary.
For many years legal scholars have noted the inequality of treat-
ment between husband and wife in the area of domestic relations. 9
Past arguments justifying the inequitable treatment of the wife,
such as double recovery,40 remoteness of injury, indirect recovery,
no common law right to services, unnatural result of the husband's
injury, fear of expansion of recovery to all members of the family,
and legislative intent have been dissected, analyzed, and discard-
ed. 1 Public opinion also has been highly influential in assuring
the equality of the female, as reflected in the areas of equal job op-
portunities and equal working conditions, which are now the sub-
ject of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4
3 7 Note, Judicial Treatment of Negligent Invasion of Consortium, 61 CoLUM. L.
REv. 1341, 1352 (1961).
88 Lippman, supra note 3, at 664. Further discussion of the intentional-negligent
dichotomy and the variance of services for husband and wife may not be profitable
in view of the explanation offered by Jacob Lippman:
This confusion.., can be traced to the use of words. Redundancy in com-
mon law pleading is familiar to all lawyers. Thus when the pleading al-
leged loss of services, conjugal affection, companionship, etc., no distinct
functions were intended. It was the same kind of verbiage that we still use
in deeds, wills and in pleadings. On this, however, has been postulated an
absurd division of consortium into services on the one hand, and conjugal
affection, etc., on the other .... It seems to me that if the right of consortium
is to be recognized, there can be no distinction made between negligence ac-
tions and so-called intentional actions. Id. at 668.
"It is not the fact that one or the other elements of consortium is injured in a par-
ticular invasion that controls the type of action which may be brought but rather that
the consortium as such has been injured at all." Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d
811, 814 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
39 See, e.g., H. CLARK, supra note 5; W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at § 119; Holbrook,
supra note 26; Lippman, supra note 3; Pound, supra note 3. See also references in
Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp., 46 N.J. 82, 89, 215 A.2d 1, 5 (1965).
40 New Jersey and Wisconsin have solved this problem by requiring a wife's
claims to be joined to those of her husband. See cases cited note 43 infra. Cf. Dini
v. Naiditch, 20 II. 2d 406, 435, 170 N.E.2d 881, 895 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
But see Pound, supra note 3, at 194.
41 For a general treatment of these arguments, see Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183
F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Ekal-v Constructive Serv. Corp., 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d
1 (1965); H. CLARY, supra note 5 W. PROSSER, supra note 3; Lippman, supra note 3.
4242 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. I1, 1965-66). For a recent application of this act
in the area of equal rights for women, see the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission's ruling that airline stewardesses could no longer be reassigned or their em-
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Within the judiciary a growing number of courts are lending
credence to these persuasions. At present there are 16 jurisdictions
that permit a wife's recovery for negligent interference with con-
sortium.4" Other states recognize the need for change, but prefer
to allow their legislatures to initiate the change.4 Although the
Ohio Supreme Court must make its ultimate decision only after ex-
amination of all attendant circumstances and re-appraisal of the
laws of the state, external pressures should also exert great influ-
ence. The time has come for Ohio to face these issues squarely,
and either join the growing ranks of proponents of the new con-
cepts of equality for women or reaffirm its adherence to medieval"
and illogical common law ideas of consortium.
RALPH W. CHRISTY
ployment terminated because of marriage or solely because they had reached age 32
or 33. Neal v. American Airlines, Inc., 37 U.S.L.W. 2133 (EEOC June 20, 1968);
Dodd v. American Airlines, Inc., 37 U.S.L.W. (EEOC June 20, 1968).
Recent cases of the Supreme Court in the field of family relations also indicate
how sensitive the Court is to the demands of equal protection of all persons in their
familial relationships. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v.
American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
4 3 Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961); Cooney
v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448 (D. Neb. 1953); Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Miller,
227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d 41 (1957); Yonner v. Adams, 53 Del. 229, 167 A.2d 717
(1961); Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches Inc., 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24
(1953); Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Acuff v. Schmit,
248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956); Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101
N.W.2d 227 (1960); Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo.
1963); Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp., 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965) (wife must
join claim with her husband's); Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498,
293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 239 N.E.2d 897 (1968); Ellis v. Fallert, 209 Ore. 406, 307 P.2d
283 (1957) (right to recover is derivative - where husband is under workman's com-
pensation wife cannot recover); Mariani v. Nanni, 95 R.I. 153, 185 A.2d 119 (1962)
(by implication) (recovery denied because action was derivative and husband was
thwarted in his action by the fellow servant doctrine); Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 78
S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d 669 (1959); Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis.
2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967) (wife must join claim with her husband's); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 90-2-11 (1963).
44 As previously mentioned, some commentators assert that the legislature is not
the appropriate place for changing laws relating to consortium:
The answer given by some courts that this is a matter for the legislature
overlooks the obvious fact that the legislature has already spoken in the
Married Women's Property Acts. The purpose of those Acts could not be
dearer: They are intended to place husband and wife on an equal footing.
H. CLARK, supra note 5, at 278. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at §
119.
451-... Precedents predicated on a medieval society are not out of harmony with the
conditions of modern society, and cannot in good conscience be deemed determina-
tive." Dini v. Naiditch, 20 I1. 2d 406,429, 170 N.E.2d 881, 892 (1960).
